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Explaining the presence and absence of Spanish farm cooperatives before 1936: a political 
economy approach 
 
 
James Simpson and Juan Carmona (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid) 
 
Spanish farm cooperatives were limited in number and performed poorly before the 
Civil War. Rather than a lack of trust and social capital, this paper advances two 
alternative arguments. First, cooperatives often failed to offer the optimal level of scale 
to farmers for their day-to-day activities. In some case cooperatives were too large, 
which encouraged more informal forms of organization. When they were too small, 
greater scale could only be obtained by integrating cooperatives into federations. These 
required top-down support, which was provided in many European countries by 
landowners and the Church, as a result of competitive politics, that required them to 
build mass parties and organize small farmers politically. By contrast in Spain this was 
not forthcoming, as the Restoration political settlement (1876-1923) removed the need 
for party competition, and consequently left the needs of small farmers unattended. 
Only in Cataluña, and to a lesser extent Valencia, did regional party politics create these 
necessary conditions.  
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The modern European farm cooperative movement began in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. It is usually considered as being linked to changes in the 
nature of farming and growth in market integration, with farmers becoming increasingly 
dependent on markets for inputs such as credit, fertilizers, and farm machinery, and 
having to sell their products to consumers living in distant urban agglomerations. The 
supposedly growing competitive weakness of the family farm was seen by one 
newspaper as caused by ‘the abuses of buyers and sellers which try to obtain at miserly 
prices the produce of the countryside, and to sell to the farmer at enormous profits 
machinery, fertilizers and everything else necessary to live and work on the land.’1 
Producer cooperatives therefore promised to combine the economies of scale necessary 
to buy farm inputs in bulk, process more cheaply farm output and market it at higher 
prices, while at the same time maintaining the strong work and entrepreneurial 
incentives associated with the family farm.2 Yet despite these advantages, many family 
farmers in Europe on the eve of the Second World War were not members of a 
cooperative, and the economic benefits obtained for those that did were usually fairly 
modest.  
A growing literature has tried to explain this apparent failure of cooperatives. In 
particular, an apparent north-south divide in the geographical distribution of 
cooperatives, found both within Europe and in individual countries such as Italy or 
Spain, have led some historians to stress the importance of trust and social capital. 
Greater levels of trust among villagers, so the argument goes, increased the likelihood 
that they would create independent associations and cooperatives.3 Other problems 
advanced include the allegedly unfavourable nature of some land-tenure regimes; the 
opposition by rural elites and merchants; the absence of credit markets; political or 
religious divides; and the difficulties to integrate easily some forms of farm production 
into cooperatives.4 
This paper, while linking some of these ideas to our story, considers two very 
different approaches to explaining the failure of Spanish cooperatives. In the first 
instance, and building on previous work, we argue that the problems associated with 
social capital have been exaggerated in the literature, as many farmers throughout the 
                                                          
1 Voz Social (1922), cited in Castillo, 1979, p.324. 
2 Valentinov, 2007. By contrast, cooperatives since the Second World War have been usually created as 
marketing associations which allow members to overcome the ‘free-rider problem’ to restrict output and 
raise prices. Fernández & Simpson, 2017. 
3 Putnam, 1993, ch. 5, Fernández, 2014, and Beltrán Tapia, 2012. 
4 See, for example, O'Rourke, 2007 and McLaughlin, 2015. 
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country did successfully create village level, ‘bottom-up’ organizations. However these 
often had to be grouped with other cooperatives in federations to benefit fully from the 
growing economies of scale and specialist expertise that cooperatives promised. As this 
required villagers to enter into economic relations with participants that they did not 
personally know, it required ‘top-down’ support provided by groups such as landed 
elites, the Church, and political parties. A major reason for the weak performance of 
Spanish cooperatives was not problems of village social capital, but rather the limited 
incentives that these different groups had to provide ‘top-down’ support to establish 
federations. As this paper shows, the objectives of these were often limited to 
maintaining the status quo in the countryside, rather than following ‘proactive’ policies 
that would have transformed farm and village economies. 
A second factor looked at here is the question of farmers’ demand for 
cooperatives, and whether they were the most efficient form of organization to meet 
their day-to-day needs. Some of the literature has stressed the importance of different 
crop-specific characteristics,5 implying that the nature of technological change and the 
size of the economies of scale required made cooperatives more suitable for some types 
of farming than others. We extend these arguments here and suggest that while 
cooperatives and their federations could offer the appropriate scale and organizational 
structure for some farm pursuits, this was not true for many other types of farm 
activities. In these cases farmers often turned to other formal and informal associations 
which were more appropriate. While cooperatives were simply too large for some 
needs, increasingly by the interwar period even regional federations proved to be too 
small for activities such as market intervention, and only national organizations, often 
backed by the state, were required.  
The paper has five sections. It begins by providing a general background to 
Spain’s farm cooperatives and examines the major arguments in the literature for their 
poor performance before the Second Republic. The second section looks at the 
European experience and shows when rural elites, the Church, and political parties had 
incentives to become involved in providing top-down help to create cooperative and 
regional federations. Only when these groups were willing to move from a ‘defensive’ 
mode that simply protected traditional agriculture, to a ‘proactive’ one, which required 
them to be willing to implement significant changes, could cooperatives make important 
                                                          
5 Hoffman & Libecap, 1991, Simpson, 2011b and Fernández & Simpson, 2017. 
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contributions to the family farm. The last three sections consider the regional experience 
of cooperatives and farm associations in Old Castile and Navarra; the Mediterranean 
region (Catalonia, Valencia and Murcia); and finally in Galicia. These examples show 
that differences in the nature of local politics and land-tenure regimes, the 
organizational power of the clergy, as well as the distinct nature of farming and access 
to markets, had important implications for whether farm cooperatives were established, 
or farmers turned to other forms of organizations.  
 
Section 1. The limits to the Spanish farm cooperative movement before the 1930s:  
As in the rest of Europe, the Spanish cooperative movement began in the late 
nineteenth century, and was linked to changes in the nature of farming and the growing 
political voice of small farmers. The family farm grew in importance over the half 
century prior to the Second World War,6 partly the result of the start of the rural exodus, 
but also because of its efficiency, given the strong incentives it offered to family labour 
to carry out farm work diligently and quickly.7 However, the success of the family farm 
required limited economies of scale in agriculture, and while this remained largely true 
even with the new farming methods appearing from the turn of the twentieth century, it 
increasingly was not the case with the processing and marketing of farm goods, such as 
in modern winemaking.8  Farmers who belonged to a cooperative therefore, could 
theoretically benefit from both the low monitoring costs of family labour on the farm, 
while at the same time taking advantage of (the economies of scale offered by the 
cooperative in buying artificial fertilizers in bulk, or) the lower costs and better product 
quality achieved by using its state-of the-art processing technologies, or benefit from the 
higher farm prices that cooperatives’ greater market power offered.9 As one French 
historian has noted, ‘if technical changes – the mechanization of arable and pastoral 
farming or the drive for ever greater production and productivity, have been the most 
visible aspect of the transformation of rural France, the spread of new forms of 
cooperation and association has been no less important.’10 
Yet with a few notable exceptions, cooperatives enjoyed only limited success in 
most countries. According to one study, as late as 1930 virtually the only cooperatives 
                                                          
6 For Europe, Vanhanen, 1984, and Spain, Carmona, Roses, & Simpson, forthcoming. 
7 Carmona & Simpson, 2012 and Allen & Lueck, 2002. 
8 Simpson, 2000. 
9 Valentinov, 2007. 
10 Cleary, 1989, p.167. 
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that held a significant market share anywhere were dairies producing butter, amounting 
to 89 per cent of national output in Denmark, 71 per cent in Sweden, 50 per cent in 
Ireland, 25 per cent in Italy, 20 per cent in Germany and 8 per cent in France. In France, 
cooperative wheat producers also accounted for 85 per cent and wine for 25 per cent.11 
This difference between the theoretical economic advantages that cooperatives 
promised, and their apparently limited contribution across large areas of Europe before 
the Second World War becomes even harder to understand when it can be shown that a 
significant number of farmers actually belonged to cooperatives.12 
In Spain, although the farming press from the turn of the century constantly urged 
farmers to establish cooperatives, the very great majority of flour mills, olive oil mills, 
and wineries remained privately owned, while cooperative sales of farm products were 
virtually unknown. On the other hand, the scattered statistical evidence, despite its 
severe shortcomings, suggests a more positive picture. Spain’s 1906 legislation, which 
was strongly influenced by the French law of 1884, allowed the creation of agrarian 
syndicates which, if they met certain conditions, could in turn create their own 
cooperative and / or caja (rural bank).13  
In the decade following the 1906 Law, the numbers of Spanish cooperatives 
quadrupled. Attempts were also made to build cooperative federations, and in 1917 the 
Confederación Nacional Católico-Agraria (CNCA) was created, which not only 
encouraged priests to establish village cooperatives, but also to provide a national 
leadership, by bringing independent Catholic federations under its centralised control. 
Between 1917 and 1926, the number of cooperatives tripled, although they then fell 
sharply over the next decade (Table 1). While the vast majority of cooperatives were not 
processing or selling farm produce, many did buy fertilizers, and some also provided 
small amounts of working capital for their members. Therefore if perhaps as many as a 
fifth of Spain’s 2.5 million farmers in the early 1930s belonged to a cooperative, their 
economic contribution to the family farm appears limited.   
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Fernández, 2014, Table 6. The high wheat figure was because of strong state intervention. Chatriot, 
2016. 
12 Dovring, 1965. 
13 Confusion exists over the exact numbers of cooperatives (as oppose to syndicates), as well as the 
numbers of independent cajas, as opposed to those cooperatives which had their own caja. Most cajas 
appear to have depended almost exclusively on their own members’ deposits, and therefore were not true 
savings banks. 
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Table 1 
Estimates of cooperatives and CNCA membership, 1907-1937 
 
 CNCA All 
cooperatives 
CNCA 
cooperatives 
as % of total 
Number of 
credit 
Cooperatives 
Cooperatives Members Federations 
1907       433   
1916    1,754   
1919 3,143 500,000 57 3,471 90.6 503 (1918) 
1923 3,212   5,180 62.0 499 
1926 3,034   5,821 52.1  
1929 2,276 200,000     
1933 1,902   4,266 44.6 646 
1937 2,700  41    
The CNCA was founded in 1917. 
(Garrido, 1994a), p.84 and (Castillo, 1979), pp.115, 275 and 475 and (Martínez-Soto & 
Martínez-Rodríguez, 2012), Table 2. 
 
In fact, figures for cooperatives and their membership are almost certainly inflated. 
For the CNCA, which was the only organization that actually published figures on 
something of a regular basis, there were strong incentives to add new cooperatives to 
the lists when they were legally established (even if still not operational) for propaganda 
purposes, but none to remove them if they ceased to operate, or their membership 
declined.14  As information on other federations is much scarcer, the history of Spanish 
cooperatives is often told only in terms of CNCA, although by the 1930s they 
represented only half the total (Table 1).  
The figures also suggest significant regional differences, with most cooperatives 
found in the northern half of the country. The historical literature has usually explained 
this geographical concentration in two different ways. First, using ‘bottom-up’ 
arguments that suggest that there was a supposedly lack of trust among farmers 
originating from weak social capital, especially in southern Spain, which reduced their 
ability to cooperate. Therefore Beltran argues that the greater persistence of common 
lands in northern Spain provided a useful stock of social capital that could be exploited 
by villagers to create cooperatives in the early twentieth century and explains their 
                                                          
14 See especially Castillo, 1979, pp.107-11.  
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greater density (Map 1).15 However if cooperative density is calculated by using the 
number of farmers, a more appropriate indicator that the total farm population, their 
predominance in Northern provinces is reduced somewhat (Map 2).16 
 
Map 1. Agrarian cooperatives in the mid-1920s.  
 
Source:  Beltrán Tapia, 2012, p.513. Members of agrarian cooperatives over agrarian 
population.  
  
                                                          
15 Beltrán Tapia, 2012.  
16 This error is also found in Carmona & Simpson, 2003, Table 8.2.  
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Map 2.  Percentage of farmers who were members of a cooperative in 193317 
 
Sources: Farmers (landowners and tenants) in 1930, in Carmona et al., forthcoming; 
members of cooperatives in Spain. Ministerio de Agricultura, 1934.    
Notes: Figures for Navarra include members of rural cajas for 1926, as the legal form of 
syndicates for this province was different to elsewhere Muñiz, 1926.  
 
Other indicators also point to greater social capital in regions outside the north than 
is usually believed. Not only did the strong labour mobilizations of 1917-9 and 1931-3 
suggest that collective action was possible among workers, especially in central and 
southern Spain, but the continued presence of public granaries (pósitos) run by village 
councils that had be established in the eighteenth century or earlier, were also strong in 
these regions (Map 3).18 Although pósitos were usually found in dry-farming cereal 
provinces, explaining their almost total absence in coastal regions in northern Spain, a 
successful village pósito in the early twentieth century appears to reduced farmers’ 
interest in creating a credit cooperative.19 
 
                                                          
17 Strictly speaking Tables 1 and 2 show the number of syndicates, rather than cooperatives. There are no 
independent figures for cooperatives. 
18 Carmona & Simpson, 2017.  
19 In Valladolid, for example, there was a 70% possibility of a credit cooperative being established in a 
village where the pósito lent to only 20% of households, but only a 20% chance when 70% of households 
received a loan. Carmona & Simpson, 2017. 
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Map 3. Geographical distribution of capital lent by pósitos in 1923 (% of total in Spain) 
 
Source: Inspección General de Pósitos, 1924, p. 60.  
 
A second type of argument points to possible ‘top-down’ failures. As will be shown, 
the Church hierarchy was often blamed for showing greater interest in the spiritual 
needs of the family farmer, rather than responding to their economic demands. In 
addition, although the CNCA was an important driving force behind the creation of 
village cooperatives, and the organization of regional (diocesan) federations, its 
influence varied considerably across the country (see below). If the Church was a 
reluctant player, the Spanish landed elite, not only often failed to help small farmers, but 
sometimes placed obstacles to protect their own lucrative businesses in the 
countryside.20 In addition, Spain’s political parties were seen as being irrelevant to the 
cooperative movement, and this resulted in a disinterest in providing the necessary 
resources for state involvement.21 However, what is not usually explained in the 
literature is why these different actors were willing to help farmers build strong 
cooperatives movements in countries such as France, but not Spain in the interwar 
period.  
                                                          
20 Simpson, 1995, pp.229-30. 
21 Besley & Persson, 2011, Chapters 1 and 2 for a discussion when governments are willing to commit 
resources to state building.  
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Section 2. Explaining weak ‘top-down’ support for cooperatives 
Farm cooperatives offered two very different types of goods: those that reinforced 
the independence of the family farm such as cheap credit or fertilizers, and those that 
changed the nature of farm organization by requiring farmers to work with others in 
joint-activities such as cooperative dairies or wineries. It is this second activity which 
needs considering. Cooperatives might provide the external economies of scale which 
small farmers lacked, but for many activities this scale was often less suitable. Small, 
informal groups of farmers were often more appropriate to purchase a piece of farm 
equipment than a cooperative, while low prices was the single greatest problem facing 
cereal producers in the late 1920s, which could not be resolved even by strong regional 
federations. Cooperatives in Spanish rural society, as elsewhere, were therefore just one 
of a wide variety of organizations that farmers could use to maintain competitiveness.  
In Europe three major groups were often involved in helping to organize farm 
cooperatives: the rural elites, political parties, and the Church.22 The reasons for their 
involvement varied significantly, both across and within countries. For convenience, 
although with some inevitable overlapping, three distinct motives can be identified for 
outside groups to help organise village cooperatives into federations: economic, 
political, and ideological (Table 2).   
 
Table 2. Motives for rural elites, political parties, and the Church to support 
cooperatives  
 Defensive Proactive 
Economic Arrest the rural exodus Improve market efficiency 
and / or increase 
competiveness of family 
farm 
Political Maintain traditional 
patron-client networks 
Attract new groups for 
voting as franchise is 
widened 
Ideological Defend a religious or Extend influence among 
                                                          
22 Competition between political parties also led to the state becoming increasingly involved. See, for 
example, Sheingate, 2001.  
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(Catholic, conservative, 
socialist republican) 
political belief lost clients or capture new 
ones 
 
The strategies followed by the different groups inevitably changed over time, 
especially given the major economic and political upheavals during the half century 
prior to the Great Depression. On the one hand, groups often had to shift from 
‘defensive’ intervention, where the interest was limited to maintaining the status quo in 
the countryside, to a ‘proactive’ mode that aimed to reverse changes that had taken 
place, or to accelerate them in new directions, in response to the increased political 
voice of small farmers and their ability to use markets rather than rely on traditional 
paternalistic arrangements. In addition, there was a greater emphasis on the ‘economic’ 
factors, and less on the ‘ideological’ and ‘political’ ones.  On the other hand, changing 
political opportunities and threats at the national level also had major implications on 
how the different groups saw the need to organize small farmers. To understand when 
these groups were willing to organize family farmers, we also need to know what drew 
them originally into national politics. We start by providing a brief sketch for Europe, 
before looking in detail at the Spanish experience.  
Following Stathis Kalyvas, neither the Church nor rural elites actually wanted to 
become involved in national politics.23 However, in countries as diverse as Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Germany and Italy between 1870 and 1920, the Catholic Church 
was forced to respond to Liberal anticlerical attacks, while the traditional rural elites 
found their control and patronage in village politics threatened by the rising industrial 
and urban bourgeoisie, that ‘stood for state rationalization and centralization’.24 Given 
the significant heterogeneity of farming systems and land-tenure regimes, and the 
essentially local nature of patron-client networks, the landed elites found it difficult to 
organize politically across large areas. Therefore, in what was supposed to be a 
temporary alliance, the Church contracted out to the Conservative elites their political 
struggle against anticlerical reforms, in exchange for the Church mobilising the voters.25 
It proved to be highly successful. However, as Kalyvas stresses, for the Catholic 
hierarchy, the creation of a new platform for lay and clerical activists inevitably 
                                                          
23 This paragraph is based on Kalyvas, 1996. 
24 Kalyvas, 1996, p.51. See also, Boone, 2014, for the links between provincial rural elites, state building 
and conflicts.  
25 Kalyvas, 1996, p.105. 
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diminished their power, while the conservative elites, especially in countries such as 
France or Italy, were often unhappy at forging close links with the Church. With time, 
lay Catholics and lower clergy looked to remove the restricted influence of the 
episcopate and traditional conservative elites, thereby creating secular Christian 
Democratic parties that ‘did not carry the baggage of aliberalism, intolerance, and 
dependence on the Church.26 From the turn of the century, if not before, peasants in 
these countries enjoyed competitive politics based on ideology rather than systems 
linked solely to personal interests. As Kalyvas writes, ‘together with Socialist parties, 
although before them, Catholic movements were the winners of mass politics’.27 Small 
family farmers benefitted not only from belonging to dynamic village associations and 
cooperatives but, by being integrated into confessional parties, they also enjoyed much 
greater voice.  The negotiating position of the family farm in these countries increased 
significantly. 
France took a slightly different route, as no confessional parties emerged during 
the Third Republic. However, a deep ideological divide and political competition 
existed between those that wanted to restore the monarchy and those who defended the 
Republic, which led to a greater political voice for small farmers, while the increasingly 
centralized liberal state threatened both the influence of the rural elite in the 
countryside, and the position of the Church in French society. As Jules Ferry famously 
declared, ‘the republic will be a peasants’ republic or it will cease to exist’28, while the 
political scientist, Sheingate, has recently written: 
Like the creation of an independent Ministry of Agriculture, the development of 
farm groups in the late nineteenth century reflected the same struggle for republican 
control of rural France. Agricultural syndicates – organisations for the purchase of 
farm inputs, rural credit, and crop insurance were the result of direct and indirect 
state action designed to bolster republican political success in the countryside.29 
Even more successful were the powerful conservative and anti-republican 
organization, the Société des agriculteurs de la France which, according to one militant 
in 1910, found cooperatives ‘a marvelous instrument to maintain the religious fervour of 
our peasants, to improve their living conditions and to prevent the iniquitous spread of 
socialism into our tranquil villages’.30  
                                                          
26 Kalyvas, 1996, p.1 and Table 1.  
27 Kalyvas, 1996, p.93. 
28 Cited in Wright, 1964, p.13. 
29 Sheingate, 2001, p.65. 
30 Barral, 1968, p.107 and Bulletin de l’Union Catholique Aveyronnaise, both cited in Cleary, 1989, p.34. 
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The success of France’s cooperative movement can be explained therefore by 
the competition between these different groups, which required them to shift from 
‘defensive’ to ‘proactive’ modes to help small farmers. The numbers of cooperatives 
increased from 2,069 with 512,000 members in 1900, to 15,000 and 1.5 million 
respectively by 1929.31 The period between 1918 and 1930 in particular was a ‘golden 
age’, as their powerful regional organizations led to rapidly growing numbers, and the 
provision of a wide range of services, including cooperatives, mutual insurance groups 
and agricultural credit.32 Large national confederations were built around commodities 
such as sugar beet (1921) and wheat (1924) and, although organized by large producers, 
their success as lobbies depended on their ability to attract significant numbers of small 
farmers. Increasingly they sought to obtain ‘fair prices’ and create more rational 
marketing systems by holding back surplus production, which required new institutional 
relations and greater government market intervention. 
France was not an exception in having rural elites, the Church, and political 
groups competing to represent small farmers, and set up cooperatives. In Italy in the 
early 1920s three groups attempted to organize small farmers, the Lega Nazionale delle 
Cooperative (socialist), the Confederazione Cooperativa Italiana (Catholic), and the 
Sindicato Italiano dell Cooperative (fascist), although Mussolini ended competitive 
politics, slowing the growth of the cooperative movement.33 
In countries such as France or Italy, the rural elites, Church, and political parties 
therefore helped family farmers create producer and credit cooperatives in response to 
changing political opportunities and demands. These political incentives failed to 
materialise in Spain, partly because electoral fraud made party competition unnecessary 
before the Second Republic, but also because of deep divisions within the Church. The 
political stability provided by the 1851 concordat and the 1876 constitution established 
both the Monarchy’s and the Church’s relations with the state, at least until the 
dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in 1923. The political stability of this ‘Restoration 
settlement’ implied that neither the rural elites nor the Church had to participate in mass 
politics, as there were no competitive elections. Power switched between the two major 
political parties (liberals and conservatives) because of an agreement whereby the 
outgoing party handed power to the other before the election, which allowed it to then 
                                                          
31 Sheingate, 2001, p.92. 
32 Cleary, 1989, p.3. 
33 Simpson, 2000, p.116. For the importance of northern Italian civic associations, see especially Putnam, 
1993, ch.5. 
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manipulate the results. Indeed, this system perhaps even strengthened the political 
position of the rural elite, as they played a crucial role in “organizing” local elections in 
response to demands from Madrid, using a combination of patronage, fraud, and 
outright threats.34 By contrast, Spain’s socialists, at least until the Second Republic, 
showed no interest in organizing small farmers (as oppose to landless labourers), while 
republican groups remained small, and generally concentrated in urban areas. 
In Spain, perhaps more than in any western European country, the Catholic Church 
was deeply divided. The divisions date from the beginning of the nineteenth century and 
were caused by how to respond to the development of a modern, liberal, centralized 
state. Following three major civil wars, the state was able to control the Church’s 
hierarchy through the concordat and its ability to appoint bishops, but while these were 
willing to accept the constitutional monarchy, many of the clergy ‘remained steadfast in 
their opposition to a political system tainted by liberalism’.35 This was especially true in 
the traditional ‘Carlist’ regions in northern Spain, where both the clergy and rural elites 
were deeply involved in village society, and often held radically different views from 
the Church hierarchy. By contrast, from the nineteenth century over much of southern 
Spain, the Church had become dependent on the landowners, and ‘thereby forfeited the 
allegiance of the pueblo’.36 Although it is difficult to measure this social division, the 
areas of high densities of parish priests in general coincide with larger numbers of 
Catholic cooperatives (Map 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 Martínez Cuadrado, 1969 and Varela Ortega, 1977. 
35 The Carlist newspaper, El Siglo Futuro, founded in 1874, quickly became the most popular newspaper 
among Spain’s lower clergy. Callahan, 2000, pp.32-3 and 61. 
36 Pitt-Rivers, 1954: 1971, p.xxi. For the role of the clergy, see especially Callahan, 2000, chapter ix. 
settlement patterns, with the dominance of small rural villages in the north contrasting with the large 
‘agro-towns’ in the south were important.  
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Map 4. Ratio of priests to total population by diocese in 1927.  
 
Source: Callahan, 2000, p. 193.  
 
 
In conclusion, the limited needs that rural elites, the Church, and political parties 
had to attract the support of small farmers is an important explanation for why the 
cooperative movement was much weaker in Spain than France. Yet as Map 2 shows, 
although nationally farm cooperatives were of limited importance, there were 
significant regional differences. If our general argument concerning the weak incentives 
that these outside groups faced to help form cooperative networks is to be accepted, it 
also needs to be able to explain these exceptions. These are now considered in the rest 
of the paper, which links regional differences in ‘top-down’ support with a brief 
discussion on the extent that local cooperatives could actually resolve farmers’ 
economic difficulties. Three large regions of small family farms are examined: Old 
Castile and Navarra and the Mediterranean coast (Catalonia, Valencia and Murcia) 
where cooperatives enjoyed greatest success, and Galicia, where the movement was 
surprisingly weak. 
 
 
16 
 
Section 3. Accounting for regional diversity: Castile-Leon and Navarra 
At first sight, conditions in both Castile-Leon and Navarra appeared especially 
favourable to create producer cooperatives, as there was a high concentration of family 
farmers living in small villages who participated widely in other community-based 
organizations, such as managing the open fields and common lands.37 Both regions 
were also strongly catholic and the clergy played an integral role in village life, while 
republican and socialist groups were virtually absent outside the provincial capitals. Yet 
although both regions had a significant numbers of cooperatives by the early 1920s, the 
movement then stagnated in Castile-Leon.38  By 1933, only 20 per cent of farmers in 
Castile-Leon and 35 per cent in Navarra belonged to a cooperative, and most of these 
held only relatively small amounts of capital (Table 3). Therefore, despite apparently 
high levels of social capital and an influential Church, the numbers and performance of 
cooperatives in both regions remained limited. After examining Castile-Leon, we then 
turn to Navarra. 
 
Table 3. Regional distribution of cooperatives and rural cajas in 1933 
  Farmers 
% of  
total 
No 
coops 
% of 
total 
No of 
members 
% of 
farmers 
in coop 
No 
coops 
with K 
No 
coop> 
100,000 
ptas 
capital 
coop in 
000s 
ptas 
% of 
total 
No of 
rural 
cajas  
Deposits in 
rural cajas  
000s ptas 
% of 
total 
Galicia 363948 13.4 314 7.4 24398 6.7 129 2 828 0.9 8 200 0.2 
Valencia 276248 10.2 365 8.6 97610 35.3 277 41 21952 22.6 65 28842 24 
Cataluña 209533 7.7 540 12.7 79018 37.7 344 64 27600 28.5 76 8216 6.8 
Castile-Leon* 372473 12.1 1256 29.6 72115 19.4 450 11 8397 8.7 124 17092 14.2 
Navarra 65168 2.4 81 1.9 22938 35.2 56 4 2474 2.6 34 4524 3.8 
 Sub-total          45.8   60.2   23.0       63.3     49.0 
                            
Spain 2711961 100 4251 100 522414 19.3 2043 179 96926 100 522 120194 100 
 
(*), includes Logroño, but not Salamanca. For Navarra, See note of Map 2.  
Sources: Spain. Ministerio de Agricultura, 1934 and, for estimates of numbers of farms, 
Carmona et al., forthcoming. 
 
The 1906 Law encouraged a rapid growth in the numbers of cooperatives in 
Castile-Leon, many of which joined provincial federations, with most of these in turn 
being absorbed into the Confederación Nacional Católico-Agraria (CNCA) after it was 
                                                          
37 Gallego, Iriarte, & Lana, 2010, pp.85-116. 
38 Between 1917 and 1924, the members of cooperatives in Castilla-León increase from 47,130 to 79,206, 
and then fell to 72,115 in 1933. See Castillo, 1979, pp.122-3 and Table 3 above. 
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created in 1917.39 The CNCA was organised by the clergy and controlled by the Church 
hierarchy. It was a mixed syndicate, and therefore interested not only in the welfare of 
small farmers, but also that of landowners and workers, which inevitably on occasions 
produced conflicts of interest and weakened its activities as a lobby. By 1929, the 
CNCA represented about three-quarters of all cooperative members in Castile-Leon, 
leaving few alternative federations for cooperatives to join, thereby restricting 
competition between different movements.40 The success of Castile-Leon’s farm 
cooperatives was closely linked to that of the CNCA’s performance. 
After its initial explosive growth, the CNCA then declined during the 1920s 
(Table 1). Several explanations can be advanced. First, there were weak incentives for 
the Church and rural elites to move from a ‘defensive’ to ‘proactive’ support for family 
farmers in the region. For the CNCA’s president, Antonio Monedero, the organization’s 
priority was to defend Catholicism, and any economic help offered to the family farm 
was of secondary importance to this strategy.41 In this respect, the rising influence of 
anarchist and socialist trade unions across Spain during the trienio bolchevique (1917-
19) led Monedero to spend large sums belonging to the Castile-Leon organizations in an 
attempt to extend the influence of the CNCA to other regions.42 However, as noted by 
Pascual Carrión in 1922, once the social unrest had subsided, so too did the CNCA’s 
recruitment drive.43 The CNCA’s decision to move its headquarters to Madrid helped 
the Church’s hierarchy maintain control over policy and propaganda, but did little to 
help it respond effectively to grass-root demands. The rural elites in Castile-Leon also 
found few reasons to help organize family farmers, as their support had been already 
effectively captured during the late 1880s’ tariff debates, and their acceptance of the 
Restoration political settlement assured.44  
According to most contemporaries, the greatest need of family farmers from the 
turn of the century was an effective rural bank that could offer them an alternative to the 
village usurer, who was believed to control the supply of working capital in the 
                                                          
39 Castillo, 1979, p.124. The Burgos and Palencia federations were created in 1913. 
40 Castile was also by far the most important region represented by the CNCA accounting, for example, 
for 28% of all fertilizers bought in 1920 by cooperatives, and 44% in 1928. Castillo, 1979, pp. 276 and 
314-5.  
41 Castillo, 1979, pp.143-4 and Callahan, 2000, p.147. 
42 Monedero was subsequently sacked by the Church hierarchy for the excessively high levels of 
expenditure on propaganda outside the region Castillo, 1979, pp.147, 150 and 166-7.   
43 Castillo, 1979, p.197. 
44 Large landowners’ organizations remained closely linked to the CNCA at a national level Castillo, 
1979, pp.154-60; Varela Ortega, 1977, pp.269-70 and 278-9. 
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countryside.45 Yet in Spain, with the possible exception of the rural banks in Badajoz, 
neither the elites nor the CNCA were willing to provide the necessary collateral to 
attract significant amounts of capital for cooperatives to use.46 In Castile-Leon, the cash 
deposits per capita found in cooperatives and cajas represented little more than the 
national average, and were only equivalent to those found in the more successful village 
granaries (pósitos) - institutions that had existed since the sixteenth century (Table 3).47 
In fact, most cooperatives only supplied farmers with fertilizers, an input which had 
become crucial for extending the area cultivated. Cooperatives could buy fertilizers 
more cheaply than small farmers and helped guarantee their quality at a time when fraud 
was common.48 In some cases cooperatives perhaps provided neither the capital nor 
storage facilities, but simply helped their members to organize collectively to buy 
fertilizers, an activity which did not need to appear in their accounts. 
The failure to create effective cooperative banks was the result not just of the 
lack of interest of the CNCA and rural elites, but also because of high banking risks 
produced by market volatility and low cereal prices in the interwar period, which led to 
some cooperatives going bankrupt (see below).49 To reduce this market volatility 
required massive market intervention, which was well beyond the capacity of Spain’s 
cooperative federations. Some of the CNCA leaders did work with the dictator Primo de 
Rivera in his failed attempt at creating a corporatist state between 1923 and 1929, but it 
was not until the 1950s that the government was able to intervene in the wheat market 
effectively.50 A final consideration is that although the CNCA was a ‘mixed’ syndicate, 
it also enjoyed limited success in helping the landless establish a footing on the farm 
ladder, in part because cereal production took place under dry farming conditions, 
offering few possibilities for increasing yields through greater labour inputs.51 
In Navarra, especially in the upland regions, family farmers worked the good 
arable land, and the considerable areas of hillside pastures were often grazed in 
common. Landless labourers were virtually unknown. Here, the ‘moral leadership of the 
                                                          
45 See, for example, Senador Gómez, 1915: 1993, pp.111-19. 
46 Badajoz in the Extremadura region, and banks linked to rural elites that were independent of the 
CNCA. See Simpson & Carmona, in preparation, chapter 5. 
47 Cereals accounted for about half of farm output in 1930. A few attempts were made to build 
cooperative granaries, but these faced fierce opposition from established merchants.  For the pósitos, see 
especially Carmona & Simpson, 2017.  
48 Simpson, 1995, p.119. 
49 Castillo, 1979, pp.145-50. 
50 See especially Pan-Montojo, 2002 and Barciela López, 1985. 
51 For the CNCA, Castillo, 1979, pp.234-54, and dry-farming and the Great Depression, Simpson, 2017. 
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local community’ remained in the hands of the clergy and ‘a rather modest upper 
class’.52 Although Carlism had been defeated as a military force in 1876, local society 
rejected liberalism and the Restoration political settlement. Therefore the two driving 
forces behind the province’s cooperative movement were a highly traditional, but 
dynamic, clergy that was central to village society, and rural elites such as the Vizconde 
Val del Erro, who not only was a Carlist senator in Madrid, but also president of 
Navarra’s cooperative federation. This was federated with the CNCA, and therefore 
controlled by the Catholic hierarchy, but Navarra’s Carlist tradition ensured that it 
maintained significant operational independence,53 while the region’s special tax status 
permitted greater more freedom from Madrid. Navarra’s religious and political cohesion 
suggests that cooperatives would make important economic contributions to village 
society.  
Yet, just as in Old Castile, the contribution appears disappointing, with the most 
successful activity once again being bulk purchases of fertilizers, which increased from 
860 to 5,600 tons between 1910 and 1923.54 Some attempts were made to organize 
sugar beet producers, but no granaries or flour mills were built, and few wineries.55 The 
endeavours to attract outside finance and create internal sources of credit were also 
disappointing. Therefore, cooperatives appear to have offered farmers few material 
rewards despite the presence of high levels of social capital, and a clergy and rural elites 
that were willing to contribute to the top-down organization. Rather than an 
organizational failure, it seems that the levels of scale that cooperatives and their 
federations offered farmers were inappropriate for most of their needs. 
In the first instance, the potential economic contribution of cooperatives was 
often greatest for crops with high value added and produced relatively close to large 
urban markets, or with access to export markets. In general this was not the case for 
farmers in upland Navarra. A more important factor concerns the risk of examining 
cooperatives in isolation, especially in Navarra’s closely knit, dynamic village societies. 
Indeed, as Majuelo and Pascual argue, the appearance of cooperatives was closely 
linked with defending village lands against privatization, an important factor even in the 
                                                          
52 Pitt-Rivers, 1954: 1971, p.xxi. However, on the fertile lowlands, landownership was more concentrated 
and support for the Restoration settlement stronger.  
53 The Federation was organized by leading Carlists, with decisions taken by majority voting and, after 
1922, the bishop’s representative ceased to have the right to veto. Majuelo & Pascual, 1991, p.66. 
54 Majuelo & Pascual, 1991, p.148. 
55 The two wineries in Navarra in 1933, were Cintruénigo (founded in 1927) and San Martín de Unx 
(1914). 
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1920s,56 while the Church in the 1930s, despite its usual reluctance to interfere in the 
contentious issue of property rights, supported Navarra’s Cooperative Federation’s 
efforts to recover those common lands that had been sold.57  
 
Section 4. Accounting for regional diversity: the Mediterranean experiences  
The Mediterranean provinces were distinctly more urban and commercial than 
those of the interior, and a flourishing trade in farm products helped to shape urban-
rural economic relations. Large property was common, but the land was usually worked 
as family farms under highly localized land-tenure regimes. The mild climate, and the 
presence of irrigation in Valencia and Murcia in particular, allowed a wide variety of 
crops to be grown. The early industrialization in Barcelona and growing urbanization 
led to the emergence of dynamic labour movements, dominated by anarchists in 
Barcelona, and socialists in Valencia. Republicanism was also present in urban areas, 
and a strong nationalist movement appeared in Catalonia, and a Catholic one that 
demanded greater self-government in Valencia, all rejecting the Restoration settlement. 
Therefore unlike Castile-Leon and Navarra, competitive regional politics helped shape 
farm organizations, and as urban politics invaded the countryside, politicians had to 
respond to the demands of small farmers, including conflicts over land-tenure relations.  
Cataluña enjoyed one of the highest penetration of cooperatives in the country, 
and their success can be explained by competitive regional party politics, rather than the 
Church, even though this continued to remain close to the rural population, and the 
clergy were often Catalan speaking.58  Local landowners and farmers began to organize 
from the late nineteenth century in response to the threats caused by cheap imports and 
the destruction of vines by phylloxera. They used state legislation to create agricultural 
chambers at the district level to organize thousands of owners and tenants.59  These 
pressure groups were led by big landowners, and resulted in the formation of a 
conservative regionalist political movement (Lliga), which captured the vote of many 
small farmers before the Second Republic.60  The Lliga was behind the regional 
organization that grouped the representatives of the four Catalan provinces into a single 
administrative unit (Mancomunitat) that helped organize and finance farm 
                                                          
56 Majuelo & Pascual, 1991, pp.165-9 and Beltrán Tapia, 2012, p.516. 
57 In particular, the owners of the corralizas, or disentailed estates sold in the nineteenth century, were 
opposed Carlism. Majuelo & Pascual, 1991, pp.182-3.  
58 Pomes, 2000, pp.179 ss; Callahan, 2000, pp.158-62, and Lannon, 1987, pp.141-2. 
59 Ramon i Muñoz, 1999, p.18 and Planas, 2013, pp.103-7. 
60 Riquer, 2001, p.210 and for Lerida after 1917, Ramon i Muñoz, 1999, p.17. 
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cooperatives.61  This explains the development of increasing numbers of specialist 
cooperative federations, not just for wine production, but also early potatoes and other 
vegetables, often for export. These attracted many small farmers and culminated in the 
creation of the Unión de Sindicatos Agrícolas de Cataluña at the beginning of 1931. 62 
The landowners’ leadership however did not go uncontested. In the most important 
winegrowing regions, a sharecropping contract – the Rabassa Morta – was widely used 
and proved particularly contentious during the first third of the twentieth century, a time 
of low wine prices. Sharecroppers (rabassaires) helped to establish the political party, 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya and, with urban republicans, enjoyed significant 
electoral success in the 1930s.63  Given their own organizing capacity and political 
success, the rabasssaires movement rejected the ‘mixed’ cooperatives of the 
landowners, but their own cooperatives enjoyed only limited success before 1936.64 
The cooperative movement in the Valencian region, comprising of the provinces 
of Castellon, Valencia, Alicante and Murcia, was also relatively successful.  By 1933, 
although the number of cooperatives per thousand farmers was lower than the national 
average, they were much larger and 35 per cent of farmers belonged to one. They also 
handled considerably more capital (almost a quarter of the national deposits of those 
cooperatives with over 100,000 pesetas in 1933), with the region’s rural cajas 
accounting for a similar figure. Historians have often explained this success by the 
presence of high levels of social capital, partly created by the presence of complex 
irrigation systems, some dating from the Middle Ages. Other factors include the 
predominance of family farmers (both owners and tenants), and the high usage of 
artificial fertilizers in areas of commercial agricultures. Large landowners were 
interested in promoting agricultural advances, especially in the export sector, but the 
Church was divided, and its influence declined after the First World War.65 Yet despite 
this interest, the Church, landowners, and republican associations all failed to build 
strong regional cooperative federations.  
The poor performance of Catholic organized agrarian syndicates in particular 
needs to be considered.66 At the end of the nineteenth century, Catholic social reformers 
                                                          
61 Casanova i Prat, 1998, pp.396-408. 
62Pomes, 2000. Planas, 2008, cites the examples of Catholic and Republican cooperatives that left their 
respective federations to join more professionally orientated ones.  
63 Riquer, 2001, p.211 and Balcells, 1980, pp.150-1. Carmona & Simpson, 1999a, for the Rabassa Morta.  
64 Conflicts date from after 1918. Pomes, 2000, p.506. 
65 Valls, 1992, p.23 and Martínez Gallego, 2001, pp.52-60. 
66 Martínez Gallego, 2010, p.227.  
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in Valencia, encouraged by the Church hierarchy, were perhaps the most dynamic in the 
country.67 However Catholics in the region became divided between those who were 
closely linked with the Church hierarchy and therefore willing to accept the Restoration 
party system and the cacique oligarchy, and the Carlists, who rejected the liberal 
political settlement and were interested in regional questions.68  One area of discontent 
was the influence of the CNCA, which was associated with the Catholic hierarchy and 
controlled by the cereal lobby in Castile-Leon, whose interests, as in Galicia or 
Catalonia, often clashed with those of Valencia’s farmers. 
The regional Catholic cooperative movement grew rapidly, and was initially the 
most important in Spain, overtaking that of Castile-Leon in 1912. However, the First 
World War saw an increase in risk taking,69 and high farm prices encouraged farmers to 
mobilize and create cooperatives to bulk buy fertilizers and export their crops, with the 
number of syndicates peaking at 256 in 1920. Some of these borrowed heavily from 
local cajas, leading to the Valencian federation, which lacked resource of its own, to 
become heavily indebted to the CNCA. The economic consequences following the 
collapse of farm prices after the First World War led to many of the Valencian 
cooperatives going bankrupt, just as it did for other dynamic federations, such as that of 
Rioja in Castile-Leon.70 By 1929 the numbers of the region’s syndicates had more than 
halved, with only a quarter being Catholic, and these accounted for just a third of their 
membership in 1933.71 
Despite its initial success, Catholicism was not a decisive force for the 
development of a cooperative movement in the Valencia region, and landowners played 
almost as important a role as in Catalonia. Some attempts were made to use regionalism 
(or foralism) against the dynastic parties, but this was insufficient to articulate an 
organization that could federate the different local syndicates as effectively as in 
Catalonia.72 In fact the most successful federation, the Federación Agraria del Levante 
(FAL) founded in 1901, played a very limited role and was unable to overcome intra-
                                                          
67 The early interest of Valencian hierarchy on agrarian questions and its national leadership until 1912 in 
Martínez Gallego, 2010, p. 231; and  Del Valle, 1947, 241-3. 
68 Millán, 1997. From 1907 the Carlists were unwilling to form electoral pacts with the Liga.  Valls, 1992, 
36.  
69 Cuesta, 1978, p. 111, notes that the CNCA was no different to other economic groups that became 
overexposed during the war years. 
70 Especially in 1921, Castillo, 1979, p.147 and Garrido, 1987. 
71 The number of cooperatives fell from 301 in 1920, to 127 in 1929. Castillo, 1979, p.125 and Martínez 
Gallego, 2010, p.246-7. 
72 Attempts at political coordination by the Derecha Regional Valenciana in Valls, 1992, pp.56-58 and 
Martinez Gallego, 2010. 
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provincial and sector rivalries, resulting in the most successful local cooperatives 
actually exiting the FAL.73     
Given its high level of farm specialization, a major mobilizing factor was the 
different sectoral crises. The Unión de Viticultores de Levante, a body similar to the 
Unió de Vinyaters de Cataluña, was created within the FAL, and represented 150 
syndicates by 1929.74  Although only nine per cent of wine-making was carried out in 
cooperatives, distilleries were built in the larger urban areas by the Unión.75 These two 
lobbies combined to establish the Confederación Nacional de Viticultores, although its 
influence remained limited given the wine exporters’ success in protecting the legal use 
of cheap industrial alcohol to strengthen their wines.76 Interest in creating cooperatives 
for exporting oranges also fluctuated, increasing during the cycles of low prices or poor 
harvests, but falling when conditions improved. Orchards were very small, and 
cooperatives never resolved the fundamental problem of controlling product quality 
among the large numbers of growers, and the share of exports sold through cooperatives 
remained minimal.77 
 
Section 5. Galicia.  
Galicia demonstrates once again that social capital is insufficient on its own to 
explain a region’s limited cooperative movement, as collective action among farmers 
was strong, but took other forms, and included the country’s most successful farmers’ 
protest movement during the first decades of the century.78 Just as in Castile and Leon, 
the predominance of small family farms and presence of a highly influential Church and 
active village clergy might have been expected to favour cooperatives. Yet, as Table 3 
shows, Galicia had 13.4 per cent of Spain’s farmers, but only 4.7 per cent of its 
cooperative members, and handled very small amounts of capital (just 0.9 per cent of 
capital deposits, while its cajas had only 0.2 per cent of the country’s deposits). 
Cooperatives remained weak because of the Church’s reluctance to help organize 
                                                          
73 The FAL in Martínez Gallego, 2010, and Martínez Soto, 2000. For the difficulties to federate 
cooperatives, Garrido, 1996; the conflicts between provinces, in Martínez Gallego, 2010.  
74 Martínez Gallego, 2010, p.234. 
75 Martínez Gallego, 2010, pp.236-9. 
76 Fernández, 2008. 
77 Carmona & Simpson, 2003, pp. 251-3 and Garrido, 2014. 
78 The case of Ribadeo shows how professional interests dominated, as the Catholic cooperatives 
integrated in a federation controlled by non-Catholics in 1928, although this used the services of the 
Madrid’s conservative Asociacion de los ganaderos del reino to sell their animals. Lombardero Rico, 
1997, pp.540 and 544.   
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farmers when property rights were questioned, while emigrants in the Americas sent 
significant amounts of capital, thereby reducing farmers’ dependence on both the 
Church and rural elites.79 As livestock products accounted for 44 per cent of farm 
output, most farmers were interested in cheap cattle feed, which also reduced the 
influence of the CNCA and its support of the cereal lobby.80 
In contrast to the Mediterranean regions, landowners in Galicia were generally 
unwilling to provide the leadership to build cooperative federations because farm 
politics were dominated by the foro question. Unlike the rabassa morta, landowners 
were rentiers and totally divorced from the production process.81 From the 1890s 
tenants demanded the right to purchase their land and a strong movement led to rent 
strikes and occasional violence, before the legal right to redemption was granted in 
1926.82 The foro movement was supported by republicans, liberals, and emigrants, but 
also attracted large numbers of Catholic groups, such as those led by the priest Basilio 
Alvarez, as well as Carlists, who were strong in the region.83 By contrast, the Church 
hierarchy initially opposed the movement, thereby siding with conservatives and the 
local caciques, or political bosses.84 In time, however, it too supported a moderate 
project that would eventually form part of the 1926 law.85 However, according to 
Vázquez de Mella, an influential Galician Carlist who favored agrarian syndicates, 
many parish priests actually sided with the caciques, and therefore opposed them.86  
The Church’s influence was limited not just for ideological reasons. Although it 
had played a major role in the rapid growth between 1918 and 1921, most of the 486 
cooperatives achieved little, and the movement declined in the 1920s.87 As elsewhere, 
the smaller cooperatives appear to have suffered from management problems which 
                                                          
79 Villares, 1982.  
80 Simpson, 1995b, Simpson, 2001, p.116, and Miguez Macho & Cabo Villaverde, 2010, p.237.  
81 See Carmona and Simpson, forthcoming. 
82 In fact, helped by growing livestock sales and emigrants’ remittances, many had already been bought. 
Villares, 1982. 
83 The republicans created Solidaridad Gallega, which had around 400 agrarian organizations between 
1907 and 1911, copying the Catalan model (Solidaritat), with the objective of displacing the two 
Restoration political parties and end the foro. However, despite a successful grassroots movement, they 
did not create large cooperative federations as in Catalonia. Cabo Villaverde, 2006, p. 254. The number of 
organizations in Pomes, 2000, p.114, and failure in Cabo Villaverde, 2006, p. 238. 
84 Lombardero Rico, 1997, 537-49, gives the example of successful Catholic cooperative in Ribadeo, 
where the absence of foros avoided farmers’ hostility.  
85 Martínez López, 1989, pp.189-90.  
86 However, it is not clear whether this refers to them opposing just clerical cooperatives, or all 
cooperatives. Rodriguez Lago, 1997, p., 322.  
87 Miguez Macho & Cabo Villaverde, 2010, for the success of the antiforo movement; Martínez López, 
1989, p.65, for the drop in the number of cooperatives. 
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were not resolved by their federations.88 The growing complexity of farm activities 
required technical support, but the cooperatives were often staffed by individuals 
involved in the Church’s social work.89 The activities of most Catholic cooperatives 
therefore remained limited and can be illustrated by the fact that a single, non-Catholic 
cooperative in the municipality of Betanzos (La Coruna) distributed 220 tons of 
fertilizers annually among its 250 members, compared to the 860 tons that were 
supplied by all Galicia’s Catholic cooperatives in 1929.90  
Once again the scale of village-level organizations appears far too small to 
create an efficient marketing system to resolve the problems of the region’s principal 
commodity, live cattle. Cooperative sales failed because of the difficulties of 
concentrating sufficient numbers of animals at railway stations, and because cooperative 
member sold their best animals privately.91 The ambitious project to build a cooperative 
slaughterhouse in Porriño failed for similar reasons, as well as the opposition of private 
merchants, and difficulties for members to monitor the cooperative’s activities.  
The 1933 figures show that cooperatives and cajas held few financial reserves 
but, as noted above, it is likely that some organized a variety of activities privately, such 
as buying fertilizers in common, providing legal advice,92 or mutual insurance, pursuits 
which did not have to appear in the accounts.93 Furthermore, there is considerable 
evidence that Galician farmers cooperated widely among themselves, both formally and 
informally. Livestock improvements at this time included selective breeding; the 
adaptation and diffusion of hybrid maize; improvements in pasturelands; and veterinary 
services, all of which were provided by a mixture of public (municipal) and private 
bodies.94 The strong regional identity led to a number of government sponsored 
organizations – the Escuela de Veterinaria (1882), the Granja Agrícola Regional (1888) 
and the Misión Biológica de Galicia (1921) being well supported, and playing important 
roles in the local agriculture.95 Groups of farmers bought fertilizers and farm machinery, 
sometimes with the support of the middle classes in the small neighbouring towns.96  
                                                          
88 The Galician federations did not appoint inspectors until 1921-1923. Martínez López, 1989, p. 36. 
89 Martínez López, 1989, pp.37-8. 
90 Fernández Prieto, 1992, p.201.  
91 Martínez López, 1995, pp.165-71. 
92 The syndicate in Enfesta (Coruña), not only helped to resolve legal problems, but offered technical 
classes and literacy courses. Bernárdez Sobreira & Cabo Villaverde, 1997, pp.341-2.  
93 Lombardero Rico, 1997, p. 544. Fernández Prieto, 1992, p.168, shows that 46% of the 506 agrarian 
societies created between 1895 and 1936 in la Coruña were for mutual insurance.  
94 Fernández Prieto, 1997, p.139. 
95 Pan-Montojo, 2005, Ch. 5 and 6. 
96 Fernández Prieto, 1992, pp.168, 190 and 213.  
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Yet the most spectacular success of informal cooperation was the purchase of 
expensive, modern threshing machines. These were considered crucial to reduce the 
exceptional labour peaks on the tiny family farms caused by tasks with heavy labour 
demands coinciding, including milking, harvesting, and hay-making. By the 1930s 
threshing machines were found in perhaps one, of every two, parishes.97 These 
initiatives were local in scope and professional in nature, which helped reduce 
ideological conflicts among members. 
 
Conclusions 
 In this paper we have argued that there is insufficient evidence to conclude 
that the lack of social capital and trust can explain the shortage of effective cooperatives 
in Spain. Instead, two alternative arguments are advanced. First, cooperatives often 
failed to offer the optimal level of scale for farmers to carry out their day-to-day 
farming activities during the first third of the twentieth century. On the one hand, 
informal groups of farmers were a more efficient alternative for some activities, such as 
purchasing farm machinery, grazing animals on common lands, or providing mutual 
help at peak periods of the farming calendar. On the other hand, although a village 
cooperative could often provide wine-making facilities or organize the bulk buying of 
fertilizers efficiently, many other activities involved levels of scale that were 
considerable greater than what a single cooperative could offer, and required the need to 
integrate numerous cooperatives into federations. This appears to have been especially 
true in three areas: to capture outside savings which could then be channelled to 
individual village cooperatives; to enhance the supply of scientific knowledge and 
marketing information; and to provide effective channels to organize small farmers in 
their contacts with government, as well as cooperatives helping government 
intervention in the sector.  
 Strong, face-to-face trust was needed to create a village cooperative, but this 
was insufficient to build regional federations of cooperatives. Instead, outside agents 
were needed to provide leadership and coordinate the federations. Across Europe, three 
distinct groups were often willing to provide this support: landowners, the Church, and 
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political parties.98 In Spain, a number of individuals helped build successfully village-
level organizations, but the institutional support needed for strong cooperative 
federations was largely absent. Unlike many Western European countries, the 
Restoration political settlement (1876-1923) effectively removed the need for the 
Church and landowners to build mass parties and organize politically. With the social 
conflicts during the First World War, the Catholic hierarchy did begin to intervene more 
actively, but these efforts ended when peaceful conditions returned once more to the 
countryside, while the collapse in farm prices bankrupted a significant number of 
cooperatives. Only in Cataluña, and perhaps in the Valencia region, did regional party 
politics create the necessary conditions for landowners to assume the need to organize 
family farmers.  
 Spanish agriculture was undoubtedly poorer because of the lack of farm 
associations and cooperatives, but this resulted from the persistence of traditional elites 
and absence of genuine party politics, rather than the inability of small farmers to 
organise because of a supposed lack of social capital. Unlike France, for example, none 
of the major groups that helped build cooperative federations – the rural elites, Church, 
and political parties – played a proactive role in Spain. The only exception was 
Catalonia, where local politics created a need to organize small farmers. The 
consequences for Spanish agriculture were twofold. First, most small farmers lacked the 
economic benefits of cooperative federations, and in particular, a source of cheap credit. 
Second, with the coming of the Second Republic, the lack of strong local associations 
proved a barrier to the construction of a democratic political system. 
  
                                                          
98 Although civil servants also sometimes played an important role, governments had first to give them 
the powers. For a wider discussion of the relationship between political parties and government farm 
policy, see especially Pan-Montojo, 2005, 
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